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Lumen Gentium 16
Anonymous Christians,
Pelagianism, and Islam

by Eduardo J. Echeverria

Authentic ecumenism is a gift at the service of truth.1

I

ntroduction
A recent article by Professor John V. Fesko
of Westminster Theological Seminary in Pro Rege
(September 2011) answers the question regarding
the relevance of J. Gresham Machen (1881-1937),
particularly his response to theological liberalism
and its antithesis to the Gospel of Christ. Catholic
Christians will find much to agree with in this article

Dr. Eduardo J. Echeverria is Professor of Philosophy and
Theology at the Graduate School of Theology, Sacred
Heart Major Seminary, in Detroit, Michigan.

about Machen, especially Fesko’s exhortation to
stand with Machen against theological liberalism:
“Machen’s stand against liberalism must be our
stand against the same, and we must fight the battle
with the same weapons: the Word of God and the
gospel of Jesus Christ.”2 Can I get a witness? I, for
one, say Amen!
Significantly, although Professor Fesko does
not mention this fact, Machen aligns himself with
Roman Catholics, finding common ground with
them, in his stand against liberalism. Machen,
entangled in a controversy with the Protestant
liberal thought of the Presbyterianism of his
day, observed, in what is rightly regarded to be a
classic of American evangelical thought, namely,
Christianity and Liberalism (1923), that a wide “gulf ”
existed between evangelical Protestantism and
Roman Catholic thought. “But,” he quickly adds,
“profound as it is, it seems almost trifling compared
to the abyss which stands between us and the
ministers of our own [Presbyterian] tradition.” He
continues, “How great is the common heritage
which unites the Roman Catholic Church, with its
maintenance of the authority of Holy Scripture
and with its acceptance of the great early creeds,
to devout Protestants today!”3 There is no false
irenicism in Machen’s statement, but only a mere
acknowledgment of the common heritage of faith
between evangelical Protestants and Catholics
regarding biblical authority and the Christological
and Trinitarian dogmas of the early church,
particularly the early ecumenical councils of Nicea,
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Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon.
Among Reformed Protestants, Machen was
not alone in theologically aligning himself with
Roman Catholics against liberalism and secularism.
Dordt College, an institution of higher education
that stands in the Reformed tradition, especially the
Dutch neo-Calvinism of Abraham Kuyper (18371920), will appreciate that Kuyper himself wrote
in his famous 1898 Princeton Stone Lectures,
Lectures on Calvinism, about his ecumenical alliance
with Catholics. Here, too, there is no false irenicism
on Kuyper’s part. He just gives a very articulate
statement, not only of the common heritage of
faith shared by Reformed Christians with the
tradition of Catholic Christianity but also of the
common spiritual enemy of both. Kuyper wrote,
Now, in this conflict [with theological liberalism and secularism] Rome is not an antagonist, but
stands on our side, inasmuch as she also recognizes and maintains the Trinity, the Deity of Christ,
the Cross as an atoning sacrifice, the Scriptures as
the Word of God, and the Ten Commandments as
a divinely-imposed rule of life. Therefore, let me
ask if Romish theologians take up the sword to do
valiant and skilful battle against the same tendency
that we ourselves mean to fight to the death, is
it not the part of wisdom to accept the valuable
help of their elucidation?. . . I for my part am not
ashamed to confess that on many points my views
have been clarified through my study of the Romish theologians.4

Perhaps Professor Fesko would acknowledge
the “ecumenical hospitality” shown by Machen and
Kuyper, even while he warns his fellow evangelical
and Reformed Protestants in our times about the
“alarming trend . . . growing within the broader
church, even within the walls of evangelicalism,”
namely, the claim that the controversy between
Reformation and Rome is over.5 This is not the
place to give a Roman Catholic assessment of the
state of the question regarding this controversy.6
Fesko’s own summary judgment on this issue is
that, if anything, the “gulf ” between Rome and, in
particular, evangelical and Reformed Protestants,
has widened since the first half of the twentiethcentury.7
Yes, he acknowledges change within the
Catholic Church with Vatican II, “but it is not a
2
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change for the better.” In particular, “the official
teaching of the Roman Catholic Church has
become worse than anything that the Council of
Trent ever said on salvation and the doctrine of
justification.” Rome endorses not only the teaching
of Trent but also “the doctrine of the ‘anonymous
Christian’.” In its theology of religions, Fesko adds
that Vatican II promotes “salvation by good works,”
and, in particular, Rome has now turned from
semi-Pelagianism to an unmitigated Pelagianism:
“Rome once had semi-Pelagius upon its throne,
but he has now abdicated his place of honor to his
father, Pelagius.”8 Furthermore, according to Fesko,
Vatican II’s theology of religions claims that there
is no difference between the God of the Bible and
the God of Islam. Fesko claims to derive all this—
the idea of anonymous Christians, Pelagianism, and
the relation between the God of Islam and of the
Bible—from Vatican II’s Lumen Gentium (hereafter
LG), the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church,
in particular paragraph 16.9 Since this paragraph,
which I have broken up into 16a, 16b and 16c, is
central to Professor Fesko’s charges against the
Catholic Church, quoting it in full is necessary in
order to give an assessment of his charges.10
In light of St. Paul’s statement that God our
Savior desires all men to be saved and to come
to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim 2:1-4), LG
16a deals with the closeness of those who do
not belong to the Church but who are in varying
degrees related to her, as is Judaism, in terms of the
salvation-historical continuity between Judaism and
Christianity, “their common spiritual patrimony,”11as
the Council put it, or Islam’s monotheistic faith and
the theology of creation it entails, and so forth; 16b
addresses the question regarding the conditions on
how salvation might be possible for those who have
not heard the Gospel, the unevangelized, through
no fault of their own; and 16c addresses the matter
of why “very often” those conditions are not met:
[a] Those who have not yet received the Gospel
are related in various ways to the people of
God. There is, first, that people to which the
covenants and promises were made, and from
which Christ was born according to the flesh
(cf. Rom 9:4-5): in view of the divine choice,
they are a people most dear for the sake of
the fathers, for the gifts of God are without

repentance (cf. Rom 11:29-36). But the plan of
salvation also includes those who acknowledge
the Creator. In the first place amongst whom
are the Moslems: these profess to hold the faith
of Abraham, and together with us they adore
the one, merciful God, mankind’s judge on the
last day. Nor is God remote from those who
in shadows and images seek the unknown God,
since He gives to all men life and breath and
all things (cf. Acts 17:25-28), and as Savior wills
that all men be saved (cf. 1 Tim 2:4).

Significantly, although
Professor Fesko does not
mention this fact, Machen
aligns himself with Roman
Catholics, finding common
ground with them, in his
stand against liberalism.
[b] Those who, through no fault of their own, do
not know the Gospel of Christ or His Church,
but who nevertheless seek God with a sincere
heart, and moved by grace, try in their actions to
do His will as they know it through the dictates
of their conscience—those too may achieve
eternal salvation. Nor shall Divine Providence
deny the assistance necessary for salvation to
those who, without any fault of theirs, have not
yet arrived at an explicit knowledge of God,
and who, not without His grace, strive to live
a good life. Whatever good or truth is found
amongst them is considered by the Church to
be a preparation for the Gospel and given by
Him who enlightens all men so that they may
finally have life.
[c] But very often [at saepius] men, deceived by the
Evil One, have become vain in their reasonings,
have exchanged the truth of God for a lie and
served the world rather than the Creator. Or
else, living and dying in this world without God,
they are exposed to ultimate despair. Wherefore

to promote the glory of God and procure the
salvation of all of these, and mindful of the
command of the Lord, “Preach the Gospel
to every creature” (Mark 16:16), the Church
fosters the missions with care and attention.12
I intend this article to be a response to Professor
Fesko’s interpretation of LG 16. It purports to be
an exercise in authentic ecumenism at the service
of the truth, as the epigraph to this article puts
it. I will direct myself only to his charges against
Vatican II by rebutting them and offering an
alternative interpretation of LG 16.13 My argument
proceeds in three, relatively brief movements. First,
I distinguish three Reformed attitudes toward
Roman Catholicism and ask where Fesko might
be among those distinctions. Next, guided by the
1985 Extraordinary Synod of the Catholic Church
on the question of the reception of Vatican II
twenty years after the close of the Council, I set
forth some hermeneutical principles regarding the
interpretation of the Council’s documents. My
third section rebuts Fesko’s charges that Vatican II
“promotes” (his word) the doctrine of anonymous
Christians, adopts a full-blown Pelagianism, and
that its theology of religions entails that the God of
Islam and of the Bible is one and wholly the same.
Reformed Attitudes toward Roman
Catholicism
One of the necessary conditions for the practice
of authentic ecumenism, according to Vatican II’s
Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis Redintegratio, is to
make “every effort to eliminate words, judgments,
and actions which do not respond to the condition
of separated brethren with truth and fairness and
so make mutual relations between them more
difficult.”14 This is a mutually reciprocal condition
holding for all Christians engaged in ecumenical,
inter-confessional dialogue. In order to put this
condition into practice, John Paul II explains, “It is
necessary to pass from antagonism and conflict to
a situation where each party recognizes the other as
a partner. When undertaking dialogue, each side must
presuppose in the other a desire for reconciliation, for unity
in truth.”15 In recognizing the other as a partner in
ecumenical conversation, each must, at the very
minimum, recognize the other as a fellow believer
Pro Rege—March 2012
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in Christ, desiring reconciliation in the truth.
Those in the Reformed tradition who have
undertaken inter-confessional dialogue under that
condition have engaged (1) “in a fresh constructive
and critical evaluation both of the contemporary
teaching and practice of the Roman Catholic
Church and of the classical controverted issues.”
But there are others in that tradition who do
not recognize Catholics as ecumenical partners,
brethren in Christ, because they either (2) “remain
to be convinced that the modern developments of
the Roman Catholic Church have really addressed
the issues of the Reformation,” or (3) “they
have been largely untouched by the ecumenical
exchanges of recent times and have therefore not
been challenged or encouraged to reconsider their
traditional stance.”16 Where does Fesko belong in
this scheme of things?
Missing from Professor Fesko’s brief remarks
on Vatican II is the “ecumenical hospitality”
exhibited by Machen and Kuyper. What we find on
his part is an exclusively antithetical attitude toward
Roman Catholicism. He seems, for either the
second or third reason above, not to have passed
from antagonism and conflict to “a desire for
reconciliation, for unity in truth.” Why is this so?
Briefly, I suggest that an answer can be found
in the statement of resolutions drawn up by
Michael Horton, Fesko’s colleague at Westminster
Theological Seminary, in response to the 1994
ecumenical alliance of Evangelicals and Catholics
Together, which affirms the substance of historic
Christian orthodoxy as expressed in the Ecumenical
Creeds of Nicaea and Chalcedon. In the fourth
resolution we find the statement that “the creedal
consensus that binds orthodox Evangelicals and
Roman Catholics together warrants the making
of common cause on moral and cultural issues in
society” but not “cooperation among Christians as
common ecclesial action in fulfilling a common
ecclesial mission.” 17 Referring to Evangelicals and
Catholics Together, Horton denies that this alliance
expresses a common ecclesial action, fulfilling a
common ecclesial mission among brothers and
sisters in Christ; Horton’s denial, and that of the
other signatories to this statement of resolutions,
can only mean that Evangelicals and Roman
Catholics are not in fellowship with each other, even
4
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imperfectly by the grace of Christ and through
the power of the Spirit. This statement does not
mean to deny that individual Catholics may be real
Christians, but it does mean that they cannot be real
Christians if the theological explanation they give
for their doctrinal assertions regarding salvation,
the atonement, sacramental theology, divine election, and the like derive from the ecclesiastical
Magisterium of the Catholic Church. In other
words, they can’t be real Christians for Catholic
reasons. They can only be real Christians if their
explanations express the Evangelical theological
tradition:
We affirm that individual Roman Catholics who
for whatever reason do not self-consciously assent
to the precise definitions of the Roman Catholic
Magisterium regarding justification, the sole mediation of Christ, the relation between faith and
the sacraments, the divine monergism of the new
birth, and similar matters of evangelical conviction, but who think and speak evangelically about
these things, are indeed our brothers and sisters in
Christ, despite Rome’s official position. We perceive that the Roman Catholic Church contains
many such believers. We deny, however, that in
its present confession it is an acceptable Christian
communion, let alone being the mother of all the
faithful to whom every believer needs to be related.18

Professor Fesko is not one of the signers of
this statement of resolutions, but it is important
to know whether he agrees with its reasoning. If
he does, how then can Catholics and Protestants
like Fesko have ecumenical dialogue with the aim
of unity in truth? His answer to this question will
depend on whether he is, in the words of Reinhart
Hütter, an “essential Protestant” or an “accidental
Protestant.”19 “Essential Protestantism requires
for its identity Catholicism as the ‘other’.” Hütter
elaborates:
Much of essential Protestantism assumes that at
the time of the Reformation the true Gospel—
lost or at least significantly distorted shortly after the apostle Paul—was rediscovered and the
Church in the true sense reconstituted. Virtually
everything in-between, the few exceptions only affirming the rule, pertains to the aberration of Roman Catholicism. Essential Protestantism, there-

fore, in a large measure needs Roman Catholicism
and especially the papacy to know itself, to have a
hold of its identity as Protestantism.20

In contrast to essential Protestantism, there is
accidential Protestantism. This sort of Protestantism
“sees itself as the result of a particular, specific
protestation”; in short, it “has seen itself to a
large degree as a reform movement in the Church
catholic.”21 “For accidental Protestants, there tends
to be one fundamental difference—and it can be
the Petrine office itself—that prevents them from
being Catholic. This difference cannot be just any
but must be one without which the truth of the
Gospel is decisively distorted or even abandoned.
Being Protestant in this vein amounts to an
emergency position necessary for the sake of the
Gospel’s truth and the Church’s faithfulness; in
short, accidental Protestantism does not understand
itself as ecclesial normalcy.”22 Now, essential
Protestants are not only anti-papist but also antiCatholic. An anti-Catholic is someone who not
merely rejects the Catholic Church as a true visible
expression of Christ’s body, as an acceptable
Christian communion—as Resolution 6 does
above—and as the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic
Church, but also denies that Roman Catholics are
fellow believers by virtue of sharing a love of Jesus
Christ, accepting him as Lord and Savior, affirming
the faith of the early ecumenical creeds, and sharing
a familial bond in baptism and God’s Word. I want
to put the following question to Fesko: What will it
take for Fesko to recognize Catholics as ecumenical
partners and to regard himself as being engaged
“in a fresh constructive and critical evaluation both
of the contemporary teaching and practice of
the Roman Catholic Church and of the classical
controverted issues”?
Hermeneutical Rules for Interpreting Council
Documents
In 1985, on the twentieth anniversary of the
close of the Second Vatican Council, John Paul II
convened an extraordinary assembly of the Synod
of Bishops. With the aim in mind of encouraging
a deeper reception and implementation of the
Council’s documents, the Synod set forth in the
Final Report a proper hermeneutic of the Council,
namely, a framework for properly interpreting

them, in particular, six hermeneutical principles for
sound interpretation.23 These principles should be
adhered to by all would-be interpreters of Vatican
II, not only Catholics, then, but also Evangelical
commentators of the Council, such as Fesko,
William Lane Craig, Clark Pinnock, Ronald Nash,
and Harold A. Netland, among others, who purport
to make claims about what the Council teaches.24
Pared down for my purpose here, these principles
are as follows:
1. The theological interpretation of the conciliar
doctrine must show attention to all the documents, in themselves and in their close inter-relationship, in such a way that the integral meaning of the Council’s affirmations—often very
complex—might be understood and expressed.
2. The four constitutions of the council (those on
liturgy, Church, revelation, and the Church in
the modern world) are the hermeneutical key
to the other documents—namely, the council’s
nine decrees and three declarations.
3. The pastoral import of the documents ought
not to be separated from, or set in opposition
to, their doctrinal content.
4. No opposition may be made between the spirit
and the letter of Vatican II.
5. The council must be interpreted in continuity
with the great tradition of the church, including earlier councils. The Church is one and the
same throughout all the councils.
6. Vatican II should be accepted as illuminating
the problems of our own day.25

Missing from Professor
Fesko’s brief remarks
on Vatican II is the
“ecumenical hospitality”
exhibited by Machen and
Kuyper.
In the next section, I will illustrate the particular
importance of the first and fifth principles in my
rebuttal of Professor Fesko’s interpretation of
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LG 16. For now, it is important to understand
that the first principle’s hermeneutical norm is
twofold:26 one, in its intratextuality, meaning thereby
interpreting the meaning of a conciliar text within
the context of the whole document; and two, in
its intertextuality, meaning thereby interpreting any
specific document in the context of the whole
body of documents of Vatican II. Furthermore,
as the fifth principle states, intertextuality involves
attending to the living tradition of the Church,
including earlier councils, in the interpretation of
the Council’s documents, an approach that Benedict
XVI has called “the hermeneutics of continuity and
renewal.”27
There is another fundamental hermeneutical
rule to consider in the interpretation of conciliar
documents. What is, then, this hermeneutical
principle? Essentially it posits that we should not
make judgments about, say, the Councils of Trent
and Vatican I without understanding the integral
totality of Catholicism because the statements of
these councils were polemical and antithetical. In
other words, all truth formulated for polemical
reasons is partial—albeit true. Consider Hans Urs
von Balthasar’s explication of this methodological
principle: “Even though, of course, the truth of
the Councils of Trent and Vatican I will never be
overtaken or even relativized, nonetheless there
are still other views and aspects of revelation than
those expressed there. This has always happened
throughout church history, when new statements are
brought forth to complete earlier insights in order
to do justice to the inexhaustible riches of divine
revelation even in the earthen vessel of human
language.”28 In other words, the truth of these
doctrinal statements needs to be supplemented in
order to present a more balanced or comprehensive
view.29 Furthermore, Aidan Nichols has rightly
noted that “We must not ask for perfection from
Councils, even in their doctrinal aspect. It is enough
to know that, read according to a hermeneutic of
continuity, they will not lead us astray. An Ecumenical
Council will never formally commit the Church to
doctrinal error. It is, moreover, unfair to ask of
Councils what they have not claimed to provide.”30
Against this background, I turn now to illustrate the
bearing of these hermeneutical principles on the
interpretation of LG 16.
6
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Lumen Gentium 16
Anonymous Christians
Professor Fesko claims not merely that the idea of
the “anonymous Christian,” the theologoumenon,31
as I shall call it, developed by Karl Rahner (19041984),32 is compatible with some part of LG 16
but that the Vatican Council promotes this idea.33 I
now propose to show not only that the Council
does not promote this theologoumenon but also
that the central claims, if not all the assumptions
of this theologoumenon, are incompatible with
the teachings of LG and other Council documents.
Since Fesko never actually says what the idea of
the “anonymous Christian” is, I’ll begin by stating
precisely and specifically what it means.
Despite the limitations of the typology of
exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, I will use
it to state the Rahnerian idea of “anonymous
Christians.” Regarding exclusivism, we must
distinguish between ontological and epistemological
exclusivism. Rahner is an ontological exclusivist
because he holds not only that “God desires the
salvation of everyone,” but also that “this salvation
willed by God is the salvation won by Christ.”34 In
short, in reply to the question of whether a man can
be saved apart from the finished works of Christ,
Rahner’s answer is a definitive “no.” Thus, Rahner is
not a religious pluralist because he holds that not all
religions are equally vehicles of salvation.35 But he
is also not an epistemological exclusivist because he
holds that a man might be saved apart from explicitly
acknowledging and responding to Christ and his
saving works. Now, the inclusivist is an ontological
exclusivist but an epistemological inclusivist; he
holds that there is no salvation apart from Christ
but not necessarily through explicit faith in him.
How might a man come to saving faith apart from
explicitly acknowledging Christ? In particular,
Rahner has in mind the question regarding the
fate of the unevangelized; namely, what is the fate
of those who through no fault of their own have
never heard the Gospel of Jesus Christ? The idea
of “anonymous Christians” purports to answer
that question.
Pared down for my purpose here, this complex
idea has the following elements:
1. (a) There is no salvation apart from Christ; (b)
God desires the salvation of all men; and (c)

therefore—given (b), God’s universal salvific
will—“every human being is really and truly exposed to the influence of divine, supernatural
grace which offers an interior union with God
and by means of which God communicates
himself whether the individual takes up an attitude of acceptance or of refusal towards this
grace.”36 This supernatural grace has its source
in the saving work of Christ.37

. . . the truth of these
doctrinal statements
needs to be supplemented
in order to present
a more balanced or
comprehensive view.
2. This divine grace, which Rahner calls a “supernatural existential,”38 is neither the common
grace of creation nor some receptive capacity, a
so-called potentia oboedientialis, for the supernatural,
but is best thought of as a form of general prevenient grace: God’s free, unmerited, and forgiving self-communication “on the basis of God’s
saving action in Christ,”39 since this “supernatural
existential” does not itself bring about salvation
because every individual has the possibility of accepting or rejecting this grace. As Ralph Martin
rightly notes, “The individual’s response to this
supernatural existential is critical.”40
3. The conditions under which the salvation of
non-Christians—those especially who through
no fault of their own have never heard the Gospel—may be possible, whether they know it or
not, because (a) he “does not in any absolute or
ultimate sense act against his own conscience,”41
(b) he “makes a moral decision in his life . . .
[that] can also be thought to measure up to the
character of a supernaturally elevated, believing
and thus saving act, and hence to be more in
actual fact than merely ‘natural morality’,”42 and
(c) “he really accepts himself completely.”43 Briefly,
by complete self-acceptance, Rahner means ac-

cepting that I am always already transcending
myself and the finite world towards the infinite
and absolute horizon that opens me to truth,
goodness, and being. Rahner identifies this horizon with God. He claims that, in light of the
Christian revelation, we may say that this openness, which everyone now lives within, whether
he knows it or not, when informed by the gift
of supernatural grace, directs the individual towards the absolute self-revelation of God in
Christ.44 In this light, we can understand why
Rahner says, “He who . . . accepts his existence
. . . says . . . Yes to Christ even if he does not
know it”45 (a) and (b) includes selfless acts of
love, epistemic judgments of truth, and moral
acts of goodness, the latter being acts of “daily
fidelity, responsibility, virtue and loving service.”46 Implicit acts of (c) self-acceptance involve simply just being human—“whereby a
person undertakes and lives the duty of each day
in the quiet sincerity of patience, in devotion to
his material duties and the demands made upon
him by the persons under his care.”47 Rahner
regards all these as implicit acts of faith, that
is, implicit acts of acceptance of God’s supernatural existential grace, and hence those who
make such acts not only accept themselves but
also accept God’s self-communication in grace,
whether they know it or not, and he refers to
them as “anonymous Christians.”
4. Rahner assumes a virtually unlimited optimism
regarding the probable (not just possible!) salvation of most non-Christians, yes, not apart
from Christ and the offer of supernatural grace,
but apart from explicit knowledge of Christ:
“It is . . . impossible to think that this offer of
supernatural, divinizing grace made to all men
on account of the universal salvific purpose of
God, should in general (prescinding from the
relatively few exceptions) remain ineffective in
most cases on account of the personal guilt of
men.” Regarding, then, the response-rate to
that offer, Rahner states that “we have no really
conclusive reason for thinking pessimistically of
men” and “every reason for thinking optimistically of God and his salvific will which is more
powerful than the extremely limited stupidity
and evil-mindedness of men.”48
Pro Rege—March 2012
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Pared down for my purpose here, I now will
state where the bishops of Vatican II, particularly
with reference to LG 16, come down on these four
points. Regarding point 1, the Council agrees with
(a) and (b), but also with (c), if properly understood.
To understand (c) properly, we need to read LG 16,
first, in the context of LG 14, which reaffirms the
historic Catholic teaching on the threefold necessity
of faith, baptism, and the Church for salvation. We
also need to read LG 16 in light of the preceding
paragraph, LG 15, which affirms the genuine, albeit
imperfect, communion of the Catholic Church
with “separated brethren,” namely, non-Catholic
Christians because there exist elements of grace
and truth outside the visible boundaries of the
Church.49 LG 16a follows this up with the question
regarding not those who belong to the Church,
either fully or imperfectly, but the profound mystery
of how God in Christ may deal graciously with
those who have not heard the Gospel, especially
those committed non-Christians.50 As Berkouwer
rightly puts it, “the Church can see signs of God’s
grace and presence in this human life that is extra
ecclesiam.”51 In particular, it is dealing with those who
through no fault of their own (see LG 16b above)
have failed to respond to the Gospel, and so what it
says does not apply generally.52
Furthermore, the Council refuses to answer the
question of how the nonculpably ignorant might
come to salvation without explicitly responding
to Christ: “All this [(a) and (b)] holds true not
only for Christians but also for all men of good
will in whose hearts grace is active invisibly. For
since Christ died for all, and since all men are in
fact called to one and the same destiny, which is
divine, we must hold that the Holy Spirit offers to
all the possibility of being made partners, in a way
known to God alone, in the paschal mystery.”53 Rahner
acknowledges that “Vatican II is certainly extremely
reserved,” and I would add agnostic, with regard
to the answer to this question, but that boundary
does not stop him from developing the idea of
“anonymous Christians.”54 What LG 16b does say
is that “whatever goodness or truth” is found in
these non-Christian religions “is looked upon by the
Church as a preparation for the gospel [praeparatio
evangelica].”55 The Council adds, “She regards such
qualities as given by him who enlightens all men so
8
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that they may finally [tandem] have life.” The Church,
then, looks upon whatever truth and goodness is
found as a preparation for the gospel, meaning
thereby that it prepares men to receive the Gospel
of Jesus Christ, in whom completion is found: “She
proclaims and is in duty bound to proclaim without
fail, Christ who is the way, the truth, and the life
(John 14:6). In him, in whom God reconciled
all things to himself (2 Cor 5:18-19), men find
the fullness of their religious life [plenitudo vitae
religiosae].” 56 It is clear from these statements that
the Church does not assert that a man finds life in
these religions; life is to be found solely in Christ
and his Church. In other words, Vatican II does not
recognize non-Christian religions to be means of
God’s saving grace in Christ. Again to quote from
LG, but this time from paragraph 17,
The Church is driven by the Holy Spirit to do her
part for the full realization of the plan of God,
who has constituted Christ as the source of salvation for the whole world. By her proclamation
of the Gospel, she draws her hearers to perceive
and profess the faith, she prepares them for baptism, snatches them from the slavery of error, and
she incorporates them into Christ so that in love
for him they grow to full maturity. The effect of
her work is that whatever good is found sown in
the minds and hearts of men or in the rites and
customs of peoples, these not only are preserved
from destruction, but are purified, raised up, and
perfected for the glory of God, the confusion of
the devil, and the happiness of man.

Which elements of truths and goodness,
how many, distinguishing them from error, both
metaphysical and moral, and how the former are
precisely used by the prevenient grace of God
preparing men to respond to the gospel is an open
question, an a posteriori question, depending on the
religion in question.
Regarding point 2, Ralph Martin correctly
expresses the biblical teaching that “God offers
sufficient grace for salvation to every human being,
and that where sin abounds, grace abounds even
more [Rom 5:20].”57 So, even though LG does not
use the terms “supernatural existential,” it does
refer to the reality signified by those terms, namely,
the prevenient grace of God’s universal salvific will.
The major points of divergence between LG 16

and Rahner’s idea of the “anonymous Christian” are
found in points 3 and 4. Let me first deal with point
4 before point 3. Point 4 concerns the optimism
of salvation supported by Rahner regarding those
who have not heard the Gospel. I think we can
definitively say that the only way that we can infer
such optimism from LG 16 is if we fail to read
16a and 16b in the context of 16c, excluding from
consideration as well “its foundational references
to the scriptural and doctrinal foundations of its
teachings.”58 Let me briefly explain.
I distinguished above between epistemological
exclusivism and inclusivism. Many interpreters of
Vatican II simply assume that the Council adopts
a broad epistemological inclusivism, drawing the
automatic conclusion from this, given its alleged
optimism, that more people are actually saved
without hearing the Gospel than lost because most
people actually respond to the prevenient grace of
God’s universal salvific will. Karl Rahner is chief
among those interpreters.59 But this optimistic
reading of LG 16 is unsustainable when we consider
that 16c states, in light of scriptural testimony, that
the “response rate” of the unevangelized is such
that “very often” [at saepius] they are deceived by
the Evil One, becoming, then, “futile in their
thinking, their foolish hearts being darkened,
because they exchanged the truth about God for a
lie and worshipped and served the creature rather
than the Creator” (Rom 1:21, 25). Considered in
this light, the optimistic reading is stopped dead in
its track: LG 16 does not imply, let alone promote,
the idea that more people are actually saved without
hearing the Gospel than lost. Consequently, at best
we can say that LG 16 is compatible with a narrow
epistemological inclusivism, supporting some form
of accessibilism,60 that is, the possibility of people
being saved under very specific conditions, such
as, being nonculpable for their ignorance of the
Gospel.61 Better yet, I would prefer to say that LG 16
best fits an opaque exclusivism because the realization
of the possibility of salvation for the nonculpably
ignorant is left to God. That is where the matter is
left: “For since Christ died for all, and since all men
are in fact called to one and the same destiny, which
is divine, we must hold that the Holy Spirit offers
to all the possibility of being made partners, in a way
known to God alone, in the paschal mystery.”62 This

calling is about the offer of grace, not its efficacy
and finality. Thus, “God calls men to be participants
in his grace; by what means and with what effect is
not here stated.”63
Finally, as far as the idea of the “anonymous
Christian” is concerned, there remains to say
something briefly about point 3 above, namely,
about implicit and explicit Christianity. Suppose
salvation, by God’s grace, is possible for the
individual that is extra ecclesiam and who, without
explicitly responding to the Gospel, is nonculpable
for his ignorance of it. Does LG 16 teach that, say,
his living in conformity with what he knows of
God’s will, of following the light of his conscience,
and of completely accepting his humanity in the
fundamental act of self-transcendence implies that
as such he is making implicit acts of faith in Christ
in ignorance, implicitly accepting God’s redeeming
grace and, therefore, is saved? I see no evidence to
support the claim that in LG 16, or elsewhere in the
Council’s documents, a good Buddhist or Hindu or
Moslem or even, for that matter, a good Jew is an
implicit Christian. If the possibility of salvation is
realized for the nonculpably unevangelized, they
are saved objectively on the basis of Christ’s atoning
work, but they are saved subjectively because God’s
prevenient grace elicits a faith response to the light
and understanding they do have of God’s general
revelation in nature and conscience.

I see no evidence to
support the claim that
in LG 16 . . . a good
Buddhist or Hindu or
Moslem or even . . . a
good Jew is an implicit
Christian.
Furthermore, given Rahner’s and others’
optimism of salvation, “If people can be saved
without hearing the Gospel, and if except for a few,
rare exceptions [as Rahner alleges] we can presume
that almost everybody is saved, why bother to
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preach it?”64 In contrast to this reductio ad absurdum,
which implies that making a concrete confession
and explicit witness of Christian faith (see Rom 10:
9-10, 14-15) is not necessary for being saved, LG
16c urges the Church to not only heed the “Lord’s
command, ‘preach the Gospel to every creature’
(Mk 16:16),” but also to make “the words of the
apostle [Paul] her own, ‘Woe to me if I do not
preach the Gospel’ (1 Cor 9:16).” Hence, we see
the import of these words in Vatican II’s Decree on
the Church’s Missionary Activity, Ad Gentes:
Christ is the Truth and the Way which the preaching of the Gospel lays open to all men when it
speaks those words of Christ in their ear: “Repent,
and believe the Gospel” (Mark 1:13). Since he who
does not believe is already judged (cf. John 3:18),
the words of Christ are at once words of judgment and grace, of life and death. For it is only
by putting to death that which is old that we can
come to newness of life.65

Pelagianism
I now need to make a few comments regarding
Professor Fesko’s charge that LG 16 espouses
salvation by good works and hence Pelagianism.
This charge arises from several references in the
Council documents to the concrete deeds of
“men of good will,” those striving to live a “good
life” (GS 22) and “trying in their actions to do his
will as they know it through the dictates of their
conscience” (LG 16b). Rahner correctly remarks
that LG 16 “is in no way implying that here in these
cases salvation is achieved as it were in a substitute
fashion by means of a purely natural morality. This
would indeed contradict Scripture and magisterium.
It is also excluded by the words of the Constitution
[LG] itself: salvation is reached ‘non sine divina gratia’,
‘sub influxu gratiae’.”66 Still, since there is a connection
here between morality and salvation, it is important
to ask what conception of grace is involved here
since Fesko’s charge completely overlooks that, as
Berkouwer also rightly notes, “morality is spoken
of as under the influence of grace.”67
Professor Fesko’s charge misses, then, that
in those references to morality we find phrases
such as “in whose hearts grace is active invisibly”
and “moved by grace” as well as “not without
grace.” The reality of grace to which these phrases
10
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refer is connected to the saving work of Christ.
Furthermore, charges like Fesko’s also overlook,
as Gilbert Meilaender rightly notes, “that, however
it may be that the Spirit of Christ manages to
accomplish this in some ‘men of good will,’ what
the Spirit does is bring them into communion
with Jesus.”68 One final thing that Professor Fesko
also misses, but which is present explicitly in LG
15 (note: the need to read contextually!), is that, as
Meilaender puts it, “Christians themselves should
know that (in St. Paul’s words) they have nothing
to boast of before God. They have no claim on
God and no ability of their own to please him.”69
Indeed, in the words of the bishops of the Council,
“All the children of the Church should nevertheless
remember that their exalted condition results, not
from their own merits, but from the grace of Christ.
If they fail to respond in thought, word, and deed
to that grace, not only shall they not be saved, but
they shall be the more severely judged.”
Perhaps the phrases “good will” and “good
life” as well as the reference to acts of conscience
distracted Fesko into thinking that they lay the
foundation for saving faith in good works. Still,
there is no justifiable reason to draw his conclusion
that the Church affirms Pelagianism, given the
undeniable fact that the reality of grace to which
these phrases refer is inherently connected to the
saving work of Christ. Further, although LG 16 is
quite adequately non-Pelagian in the language it uses,
my point is reinforced when one takes into account
Gaudium et Spes 22. In this latter passage, not only is
grace invisibly at work in the hearts of men, but also
salvation, rather than being a matter of good will,
is decisively a work of the “Holy Spirit,” which “in
a manner known only to God offers to every man
the possibility of being associated with the paschal
mystery.” In other words, whenever salvation
does occur for the nonculpably unevangelized, it
is determined by the redeeming grace of Christ;
objectively accomplished in the mystery of his
passion, death on the cross, and resurrection; and
brought to bear on him by the sanctifying grace of
the Holy Spirit.
The God of Islam and of the Bible
Do Christians and Moslems worship the same
God? Professor Fesko lays one final charge at the

door of the Catholic Church; namely, he alleges that
LG 16a70 responds in a wholly affirmative manner
to this question. His rejoinder to the Church is that
faith in the God of Islam and faith in the God of
the Bible “hold nothing in common.”71 Now, I
respectfully submit that Fesko’s allegation that the
Church gives a simple “yes” to this opening question
is false. As Timothy George wisely notes, “There
are some questions that do not allow for a simple

Still, there is no justifiable
reason to draw his
conclusion that the church
affirms Pelagianism. . . .
yes or no answer, and this is one of them.”72 Briefly,
I want to show why the answer to the question
whether Christians and Moslems worship the same
God is both yes and no. As Kenneth Cragg once
clearly put the point I want to argue, and which I
think rightly captures the position of the bishops
of the Council, “The answer to the vexed question,
‘Is the God of Islam and the God of the Gospel
the same?’ can only rightly be ‘Yes! and No!’ Yes,
as the common ground of all we say in partial
unison: No, insofar as our convictions diverge. It
would be foolish to make either the convergence
or the divergence total, to identify altogether or to
contrast only.”73
First, let us be clear about what Vatican II does
not say about Islam. The bishops of the Council do
not affirm that special revelation is found in Islam,
either in the Qur’ān or in Muhammad, as it is in
Judaism and Christianity. Significantly, then, neither
this religious text nor Muhammad as a prophet is
recognized by the Council in LG 16a or in NA 3. We
can easily understand why. Vatican II’s Dei Verbum,
the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation,
teaches that special revelation is exclusive to the
Old and New Testaments.74 Further, contrary to
the claim of Islam that Muhammad is Allah’s final
Messenger, the prophet of Islam, who allegedly
came to complete and correct the Old and New
Testaments, bringing the revelation of Christ to

fulfillment, the Catholic Church teaches that Jesus
Christ “is himself both the mediator and fullness
of Revelation.”75
Second, what, then, does Vatican II say about
Islam as far as correspondences are concerned
between the latter and Christianity? In answering
this question, we need to be mindful of the point
that Jesuit priest and theologian Samir Khali Samir
makes, namely, “that even behind identical or
similar expression, there can be totally different
meanings that are important to learn in order to
deepen one’s knowledge of the truth, not for any
desire to emphasize the distinctions.”76 A more
precise way to put the point that Fr. Samir is making
here is to answer the question whether Muslims and
Christians have the same God by distinguishing,
along with Kenneth Cragg, between theological
subject and theological predicate.77 In other words,
do they speak of the same theological subject when
they predicate of God? Yes, they do in one sense,
since Muslims and Christians are monotheists who
predicate of God that he is “the one God, living and
subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-power, the
Creator of heaven and earth.”78 In this sense, then,
Christians and Muslims believe in the same God,
the one God, of monotheism and the theology of
creation this entails.
Still, they may not only differ in understanding
what it is they predicate of him but also diverge
fundamentally in the predicates ascribed to him.
For instance, both Muslims and Christians predicate
of God that he is one, yet they profoundly differ
in their understanding of that predicate.79 The
Christian dogma of the Trinity rejects as false the
Unitarianism of Islam. That dogma affirms that
“God is one but not solitary,”80 for he himself
exists in the communion of “three divine persons
eternally united in being, relationship, and love.”81
As John Paul II rightly explains,
We know that in the light of the full Revelation in
Christ, this mysterious oneness cannot be reduced
to a numerical unity. The Christian mystery leads
us to contemplate in God’s substantial unity the
persons of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit: each possesses the divine substance whole and
indivisible, but each is distinct from the other by
virtue of their reciprocal relations. Their relations
in no way compromise the oneness of God, as the
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Fourth Lateran Council explains (1215): “Each of
the persons is that supreme reality, viz., the divine
substance, essence or nature. . . . It does not generate, is not begotten and does not proceed” [De
Fide catholica, chapter 2]. The Christian doctrine on
the Trinity, confirmed by the Councils, explicitly
rejects any form of “tritheism” or “polytheism.”
In this sense, i.e., with reference to the one divine
substance, there is significant correspondence
between Christianity and Islam. However, this
correspondence must not let us forget the difference between the two religions. We know that the
unity of God is expressed in the mystery of the
three divine Persons. Indeed, since he is Love (cf.
1 Jn 4:8), God has always been a Father who gives
his whole self in begetting the Son, and both are
united in a communion of love which is the Holy
Spirit. This distinction and compenetration [mutual indwelling] (perichoresis) of the three divine Persons is not something added to their unity but is
its most profound and characteristic expression.82

This last point regarding the truth of the Trinity
means that Muslims and Christians also profoundly
differ not only in their understanding of common
predicates, such as the oneness of God, but also in
the very predicates they make of him. Trinitarian
dogma involves predicating some essentially and
irreducibly true statements about God, and the
source of this fundamental difference concerns
the incompatible responses given by Muslims
and Christians to the question concerning who
Jesus Christ really is. The answer to that question
is inherently and necessarily tied to the central
tenets of the Christian faith, namely, the truths of
the Incarnation, life, passion, death on the cross,
resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ, who is
wholly and truly man and wholly and truly God.83
Therefore, as Cragg rightly emphasizes, “God in
the Qur’ān is not ‘the God and Father of our Lord
Jesus Christ’. That is not a predication of Islamic
doctrine. Carrying back that significance into the
‘subject’, Allāh means a ‘difference’ in how God
is understood.” 84 And the difference is such that
although Christians and Muslims adore the one,
true God (LG 16a, NA 3), having the same God
as their referent, it is only those who know Jesus
who then would also know the Father (John 14:69; 1 John), and hence we cannot legitimately claim
12
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that the Muslim knows the God that he worships (1
John 4:2-3; 2 John 1: 7-9). This is especially evident
when “knowing” is understood “in its full breadth,”
a knowing that “can rightly be called ‘communion’
(1 John 1:3), since it is a share in the same life (John
14: 19f), a union perfect in the truth of love (John
17:26; cf. 1 John 2:3f; 3:16).”85
Cragg’s last point brings us back to Fr. Samir’s
thesis that even identical referents may have different
meanings. This is in fact the case with respect to the
reference to Abraham in LG 16a. It also brings us
back to Professor Fesko’s charge that the Catholic
Church holds that the faith of Abraham is the faith
of Islam, and to the conclusion of my response to
him.
Pace Fesko, the bishops of the Council do not
hold that the faith of Abraham is the faith of
Muslims. LG 16a states that Muslims “profess to
hold the faith of Abraham,” and NA 3 states that
the “Islamic faith is pleased to associate itself ”
with Abraham. Yes, Muslims follow the example
of Abraham in submitting to God, states NA 3,
but neither the latter nor LG 16a holds that a real
salvific relationship, let alone a covenantal one, exists
between Muslims and Abraham, as if Abraham is a
common source of faith in the history of salvation
between Christians and Muslims.86 By contrast,
states NA 4, there exists a “spiritual bond linking
the people of the New Covenant with Abraham’s
stock.” In other words,
The Church of Christ acknowledges that in God’s
plan of salvation the beginning of her faith and
election is to be found in the patriarchs, Moses,
and the prophets. She professes that all Christ’s
faithful, who as men of faith are sons of Abraham
(cf. Gal 3:7), are included in the same patriarch’s
call and that the salvation of the Church is mystically prefigured in the exodus of God’s chosen
people from the land of bondage. 87

That the bishops of the Council did not affirm
a spiritual patrimony common to Christians and
Muslims is even clearer when we consider the
first draft of LG 16a: “The sons of Ishmael who,
professing Abraham as a father, also believe in
the God of Abraham.”88 One might have some
grounds for Fesko’s charge on the basis of this
draft but not on the final version. The latter states
only that Muslims profess “to hold the faith of

Abraham.” This statement does not imply that there
exists a salvation-historical continuity or covenantal
relation between Muslims and Abraham. Rightly so,
since in reply to the question “Who are the sons of
Abraham?” the answer must be (in the words of
St. Paul) “the men of faith” (Gal 3:7; see also, 3:9),
namely “those who are justified by faith in Christ
and whose life is guided by the principle of faith.”89
Therefore, Islam fails to pass the “Galatian test of
what it means to be Abrahamic”:
Abraham is not . . . one source of three faiths
[Judaism, Christianity, and Islam]. Christ was his
“singular issue” (Gal 3:16), Christ and only Christ.
What counted with Abraham in God’s saving plan
was “his faith in God” (3:5), for which he was
blessed (3:13). In the fullness of time that blessing
was Christ Jesus, nothing else. Abraham in God’s
saving plan is not a “source” of anything else. Such
an assertion is not “the gospel of Christ” but “another gospel” (1:6f). Making references to Abraham in a religious document like the Koran and
citing him as a example of a prophet and believer
in the oneness of God is not Abrahamic therefore
in the Christian understanding of “Abrahamic.”
Judaism led to Christ, therefore it was Abrahamic.
Islam does not.90

In conclusion, in rebutting Professor Fesko’s
charges that LG 16 affirms the theologoumenon
of the “anonymous Christian,” the heresy of
Pelagianism, and that the God of Islam and of
Christianity is wholly identical, I trust that I have
provided some context for further ecumenical
conversation between us. In the words of the
epigraph to this article, “Authentic ecumenism is a
gift at the service of truth.” I hope that as fellow
Christians we shall avail ourselves of the Lord’s
gift.91
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